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Abstract
This paper analyzes the interaction of international migration of high-skilled
labor and relative wage income between source and destination economies of ex-
patriates. We develop an overlapping-generations model with increasing returns
which suggests that international integration of the market for skilled labor ag-
gravates between-country inequality by harming those which are source economies
to begin with while beneting host economies. The result is robust to allowing
governments to optimally adjust productivity-enhancing investments which could
potentially attenuate brain drain. Optimal public investment tends to decrease in
response to higher emigration.
Key words: Brain drain; Between-country wage di¤erences; Public invest-
ment; Total factor productivity.
JEL classication: F22; O30; H40.
Acknowledgements: We are indebted to the editor, Gordon Hanson, and two anonymous referees for
substantially improving the paper. We are also grateful to Michel Beine, Bruno S. Frey, Hillel Rapoport,
Avi Simhon, and John Wilson for comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. We also beneted from
discussion with seminar participants at the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, University of Zurich,
University of Geneva, University of Fribourg, University of Siegen, the Annual Meeting of the European
Economic Association 2008 in Milan, the conference Globalization and the Brain Drain. Theory,
Evidence and Policy(December 2008) in Jerusalem and Ramat Gan, and the Annual Meeting of the
German Economic Association 2009 in Magdeburg.
yUniversity of Fribourg; CESifo, Munich; and Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn. Postal
adress: University of Fribourg, Departement of Economics, Bd. de Pérolles 90, G424, 1700 Fribourg,
Switzerland. Tel.: +41 (026) 3009383. Email: volker.grossmann@unifr.ch
zUniversity of Fribourg, Departement of Economics, Bd. de Pérolles 90, F410, 1700 Fribourg, Switzer-
land. Tel.: +41 (026) 3009382. Email: david.stadelmann@unifr.ch
1 Introduction
In the year 2000, 20.4 million tertiary educated immigrants lived in OECD countries,
up from about 12.5 million in the year 1990 (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006). Half of the
skilled migrants resided in the US and about a quarter in other Anglo-Saxon countries.
Liberalization of international labor markets continues, particularly for high-skilled work-
ers. New regulation in developed countries, such as the blue cardscheme adopted by
the Council of Europe in May 2009, tends to reduce immigration barriers for high-skilled
labor. Thus, the outow of skilled individuals from developing countries may further in-
crease in the near future. The European Commission has also raised concerns, however,
that high-skilled emigration could harm developing regions which are already su¤ering
from brain drain such as the Caribbean, Central America and Sub-Saharan Africa.
This paper examines the impact of increasing mobility of high-skilled workers on inter-
national migration and relative wage income between source and destination economies
of expatriates. At the same time, we account for the fact that cross-country di¤erences
in wages for skilled workers are an important determinant of high-skilled migration in
the rst place (e.g., Lucas, 2005; Grogger and Hanson, 2008). Thus, we focus on the
dynamic interaction of between-country wage di¤erences for the skilled and brain drain
from poor to rich countries. We develop an overlapping-generations model with endoge-
nous educational and locational choice of individuals, where brain drain has detrimental
e¤ects on total factor productivity (TFP) in an economy. Declining mobility costs for
high-skilled workers lead to further emigration which reduces TFP in countries already
facing brain drain. Consequently, and contrary to conventional wisdom from standard
(one-sector) models, even skilled workers in source countries lose. Thus, our model
suggests that income di¤erences for skilled labor across countries and between-country
income inequality widen in response to increased migration of skilled workers.
Source countries may respond with di¤erent policies to mitigate brain drain if ad-
vanced economies open up their labor markets for skilled migrants. In view of our
focus on the e¤ects of high-skilled migration on productivity di¤erences across countries,
we ask whether source countries should try to attenuate brain drain by raising public
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expenditure for productivity-enhancing measures, like publicly nanced investments in
infrastructure or basic education.1 Our analysis on the optimal policy response of source
countries suggests that developing countries may not want to implement such a policy
change to mitigate the brain drain problem. We argue that, from the perspective of
non-migrants in source economies, it rather tends to be optimal that public investment
expenditure is reduced if international labor markets for skilled workers further integrate.
The result may hold true even if governments can run public decits to nance public
investment.2 In any case, the analysis again suggests that declining mobility costs do not
only trigger emigration in source economies. They also fuel future emigration pressure,
by reducing wage income even for skilled non-migrants. Thus, our main result is robust
to allowing for endogenous public investment responses.3
In line with seminal papers on brain drain like Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), we
emphasize adverse e¤ects of outward migration for the source economy. In contrast
to this earlier literature, we focus on the dynamic interaction between emigration and
between-country inequality through adverse productivity e¤ects of brain drain. More
recently, scholars pointed to potential brain gain e¤ects for the sending country (e.g.,
Mountford, 1997; Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz, 1997, 1998; Beine, Docquier and
Rapoport, 2001). They show that if emigration prospects of skilled workers in developing
countries are uncertain due to immigration quotas in advanced countries, a higher quota
(better emigration prospect) fosters incentives to acquire education. The drain e¤ect
from higher outows may then be dominated by an increase in the domestic skilled labor
force. While not denying this possibility, our theoretical analysis does not emphasize
such a mechanism.4 We also abstract from potential gains for source economies from
1Justman and Thisse (1997, 2000) examine the implications of increasing mobility of high-skilled
labor on publicly nanced higher education. They analyze a non-cooperative game between two sym-
metric, advanced countries. In contrast, we assume that (higher) education is private and focus on the
perspective of a developing country which faces brain drain to a more advanced country.
2The result is not due to a decrease in the tax base stemming from additional outows. It also holds
if individuals are forced to pay taxes in their country of birth, irrespective of their residency. In the
present paper, we examine the optimal government response as a robustness check for our main results.
3Grossmann and Stadelmann (2009) provide empirical evidence for a negative impact of higher
emigration rates of skilled workers on public investment.
4In our model, migration possibilities are known ex ante to individuals and taken into account in
the education decision. However, there is no explicit immigration quota, albeit there exist migration
costs. In fact, the empirical relevance of a potential brain gain mechanism seems to be conned to
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remittances since we are interested in rst-order e¤ects of migration ows of high-skilled
workers on market incomes.
Our paper may be most closely related to Miyagiwa (1991) and Mountford and
Rapoport (2007). Miyagiwa (1991) aims to explain why countries like the US can pay
high wages to skilled professionals and therefore attract the best immigrants from abroad.
He assumes that there are increasing returns to education, which implies that the wage
level of educated workers rises with the amount of skilled labor. In contrast, we endoge-
nously derive e¤ects of migration on TFP by borrowing from increasing-returns frame-
works common in endogenous growth and new trade theory. Mountford and Rapoport
(2007) analyze the interaction between migration ows, human capital formation in the
presence of human capital externalities, and fertility. In their model population size
increases in poor countries which su¤er from brain drain due to fertility responses. Con-
sequently, between-country inequality is predicted to rise in the longer run for a very
di¤erent reason than in our model.
There is a large literature on potential wage e¤ects of immigration (surveys are pro-
vided by Borjas, 1994, and Card, 2009). The e¤ects seem generally to be negative and
of small magnitude if all immigrants are considered. According to Borjas (2003), immi-
grants with college degree, contrary to conventional wisdom, may have a positive, albeit
again a small impact on wages for college-educated natives in the US. Dustmann, Fabbri
and Preston (2005) report for the UK that the e¤ects of high-skilled immigration on
wages is, if anything, positive. In a similar vein, Friedberg (2001) shows that native
wages rise when immigrants enter high-skilled occupations in the Israeli labor market.
Our theory is consistent with such empirical evidence on wage e¤ects of high-skilled
migration.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model. Section 3 analyzes the relationship between emigration and relative wage income
between source and destination. Section 4 extends the basic model to account for an
optimal adjustment of public investment. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
poor countries with rather low levels of human capital and low emigration rates of the skilled (Beine,
Docquier and Rapoport, 2001, 2008).
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2 The Basic Model
Consider a small overlapping generations economy. Individuals live two periods and are
endowed with one unit of time. Each period, a unit mass of individuals is born. In the
rst period of life, each individual decides whether to become high-skilled, which requires
e 2 (0; 1) units of time, or to remain low-skilled. High-skilled individuals may emigrate
at some cost which may di¤er among individuals. In order to focus on migration patterns
of high-skilled workers, we assume that low-skilled labor is immobile.5 Time not used for
education is inelastically supplied to a perfect labor market. Individuals may also save
(or borrow) freely in an international nancial market at an exogenous world market
interest rate, r. In the second period of life, individuals retire and live o¤ their savings.
Let ct;y(i) and ct+1;o(i) denote the consumption level of a homogenous nal good
of individual i in period t = 1; 2; ::: (when young) and t + 1 (when old), respectively.
Preferences are represented by the intertemporal utility function
Ut(i) = log ~ct;y(i) +  log ~ct+1;o(i); (1)
with discount factor  2 (0; 1), where
~cy(i) =
8<: cy(i) if i does not migrate,cy(i)
1+(i)
if i migrates;
(2)
the denition for ~co(i) is analogous.6 That is, if an individual chooses to work abroad, the
consumption level is discounted in both periods.7 Parameter  (i) captures, for instance,
individual-specic costs of living in a foreign social environment and the treatment of
foreigners by administrative bodies. It is known to individuals ex-ante. It is distributed
according to a continuous p.d.f. '(), with support , where inf   0. The c.d.f. of  is
denoted by (). It turns out that in order to avoid the possibility of multiple long-run
5This can be motivated by the fact that migration costs are higher for people with lower education as
they are more likely to have di¢ culties in nding a job, learning a foreign language and integrating in the
foreign society. Furthermore, institutional barriers in potential host economies may prevent migration
of low-skilled workers.
6Time index t is omitted whenever this does not lead to confusion.
7For a similar way of modelling migration costs, see Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997).
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equilibria, it is su¢ cient (but not necessary) to assume that
'0()  0 for all  2 . (A1)
When deciding whether or not to become skilled, individuals take both migration
incentives and costs into account. The disposable wage income in t of a skilled migrant
abroad (net of possible taxes in the destination country and a possible emigration tax)
is exogenously given by yt.
The nal good is chosen as numeraire. In t, output Yt is produced under perfect
competition, according to the technology
Yt = (Xt)
(AtHY;t)
(AtLY;t)
1  ; (3)
;  2 (0; 1). HY and LY is the high-skilled and low-skilled labor input, respectively, A
measures the e¢ ciency of labor, and X denotes the input of a manufactured (composite)
capital good.
There is a perfectly competitive sector which produces the capital good by combining
n intermediate inputs according to the CES-production function
Xt =
nt 1R
0
xt 1(j)dj
 1

; (4)
where x(j) denotes the quantity of the intermediate input produced in sector j 2 [0; n].8
The time lag of one period in the input-output relationship (4) captures that the capital
good has to be produced in advance of using it as an input in the nal goods sector.
As in endogenous growth theory and new trade theory, each intermediate input j is
produced by a monopolistic rm. Intermediate goods producers can transform one unit
of foregone consumption into one unit of output, i.e., the marginal cost is equal to the
interest rate r. There is a large number of potential intermediate goods producers in the
economy. Entry is free but requires a xed amount of f > 0 units of skilled labor (e.g.
8According to (3) and (4), there are constant-returns to scale in the production of both the nal
good and the capital good.
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adminstrative and managerial overhead requirement) each period.9 The number of rms
in t  1, nt, is endogenously determined via free entry, whereas n0 > 0 is given.
For a given amount of resources employed in production, TFP is increasing in n. To
see this, consider an equilibrium where all rms produce the same amount, x(j) = x
(which will be shown to hold). The economys capital stock is given by K  nx.
Thus, we have Y = BK(HY )(LY )1  , where TFP is given by B  (An)1  and
increasing in n. In other words, since the marginal productivity of each intermediate
good is declining, an increase in the number of intermediate goods leads to specialization
gains which in turn boost TFP. This mechanism has been emphasized by monopolistic
competition models in new trade theory (e.g., Ethier, 1982) and endogenous growth
theory (e.g., Romer, 1990). It is adopted here to endogenize adverse productivity e¤ects
of brain drain in the source economy.
The measure A for the e¢ ciency of labor is held constant in the basic model. In
section 4, we extend the analysis to examine if the main insights change if (benevolent)
national governments can react to declining mobility costs (and possibly larger migration
ows), by raising public investment, which in turn a¤ects A. We will assume that public
investment is nanced by proportional income taxation. For the moment, suppose the
income tax rate in each period,  t 2 [0; 1), is exogenous.10
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we analyze the equilibrium from a developing countrys perspective which
will face brain drain in equilibrium. Immigration could be treated analogously, but is
not considered here for the sake of brevity (see Grossmann and Stadelmann, 2008, for a
way this can be done).
An individual i with disposable income yt(i) in the rst period of life, t, maximizes
9Assuming instead that the labor requirement is partly or exclusively in terms of low-skilled labor is
inconsequential for the main results.
10We may assume that the tax revenue is spent for a public good which enters the utility function in
an additive fashion. In this case, public good consumption does not a¤ect any decision.
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intertemporal utility (1) subject to the constraint
ct+1;o(i) = (1 + r) [yt(i)  ct;y(i)] : (5)
Observing the denition of ~ct;y(i) and ~ct+1;o(i), it is easy to show that this leads to the
indirect utility function
Ut(i) =
8<: (1 + ) log yt(i) + b  v(yt(i)) if i does not migrate,(1 + ) log  yt(i)
1+(i)

+ b if i migrates,
(6)
where b   log [(1 + r)]  (1 + ) log(1 + ) is an unessential constant.
In equilibrium, as all workers have the same time costs e to acquire education, net
wage income for high-skilled and low-skilled workers must be proportional in the domestic
economy.11 Formally, denoting by wH and wL the gross wage rate for high-skilled and
low-skilled labor, respectively, in equilibrium we have
wH(1  e) = wL: (7)
The capital goods sector maximizes the present discounted value (PDV) of prots.
In period t  1, it solves
max
Xt, fxt 1(j)gnt 10

PtXt
1 + r
 
nt 1R
0
pt 1(j)xt 1(j)dj

s.t. (4), (8)
taking the price of the capital good, P , as well as intermediate input prices, p(j), j 2
[0; n], as given. The rst-order conditions and the fact that P equals the marginal
product of the capital good, Y=X, implies the following inverse demand function for
11The assumption that time costs to become skilled are identical across individuals is made for sim-
plicity and does not a¤ect the main results of this paper. However, as a result of heterogeneity in
education costs, brain drain would have e¤ects on domestic wage inequality. Such e¤ects would also
arise if the number of skilled and unskilled workers were exogenous. Modeling the education decision
intends to take a longer run view. This is natural in our context where we emphasize productivity e¤ects
of brain drain. See, for instance, Yabuuchi and Chaudhuri (2007) for a theoretical analysis of the e¤ects
of migration on domestic wage inequality when education levels are exogenous.
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intermediate input j:
pt 1(j) =

1 + r
Yt
(Xt)
xt 1(j) 1: (9)
Recalling that intermediate input rms have marginal cost r, prots (sales revenue
minus production costs minus xed costs) of rm j in t  1 are given by
t 1(j) = max
pt 1(j);xt 1(j)
f(pt 1(j)  r)xt 1(j)  wH;t 1fg s.t. (9). (10)
It is easy to show that prices are set according to pt 1(j) = r=.
In equilibrium, due to free entry, the zero-prot condition t 1(j) = 0 for all j and
t must hold. Finally, labor markets must clear. Denote the total number of skilled and
unskilled natives by H and L, respectively, i.e., H + L = 1, and the mass of skilled
emigrants by m. H, L and m are endogenously determined.
The labor market clearing conditions read12
LY = L; (11)
HY + nf = (1  e)(H  m): (12)
Moreover, disposable income y(i) of a skilled non-migrant is wnetH  (1  )wH whereas
emigrants earn y abroad. Thus, according to indirect utility function (6), a skilled
worker i migrates if and only if y  (1 + (i))wnetH . This condition can be rewritten as
(i)  y=wnetH   1. Thus, if y  wnetH , the number of emigrants is given by
m = 

y
wnetH
  1

: (13)
Making use of equilibrium conditions and derived relationships we nd that the following
result holds:
12Recall that there are HY skilled workers in the nal goods sector and each of the n intermediate
good rms employs f skilled workers. Also recall that skilled individuals work only a fraction 1   e of
their time and that there are H  m skilled workers remaining in the economy after emigration.
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Lemma 1. In equilibrium, the wage rate for skilled labor is given by
wH;t = Atnt 1; (14)
   1   1  
1 e
 1  
1 

2
(1+r)r
 
1 
. The number of intermediate good rms evolves
according to the rst-order di¤erence equation
nt =
1  e
f

1  

yt
(1   t)Atnt 1   1

  1 + r

nt 1  Z(nt 1): (15)
We have Z(0) = 0, lim
n!0
Z 0(n)!1, lim
n!1
Z 0(n) < 0 and, under assumption (A1), Z 00(n) <
0. The number of rms in t   1, nt 1, is negatively associated with the number of
emigrants in t:
mt = 

yt
(1   t)Atnt 1   1

: (16)
All proofs are relegated to an on-line appendix.13
Wage rates positively depend on the number of rms, n, due to specialization gains
which arise if more intermediate goods are available, as discussed above. The model thus
proposes a novel microfoundation for the notion that brain drain reduces productivity
in an economy. The mechanism runs through the adverse e¤ects of brain drain on the
number of founded rms.
We now make use of Lemma 1 to examine the impact of a decrease in mobility
costs (further international integration of the market for skilled labor) on emigration,
the number of intermediate good rms, TFP, and wages. A decrease in mobility costs
is dened as a shift in the c.d.f. of , from 0() to 1(), such that 1() > 0() for
all  in the interior of support  (i.e., 0() rst-order stochastically dominates 1()).
In words: for any given , the share of individuals with mobility costs higher than 
declines and the share of individuals with costs lower than  increases. This leads to the
main result of this paper.
Proposition 1. Suppose that   yt
(1  t)At is time-invariant and (A1) holds.
14
13Stable link: http://www.unifr.ch/makro/assets/files/publications/Proofs_BD_JDE.pdf
14For instance,  is time-invariant if the tax rate  is time invariant and net income abroad, y, grows
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Then:
(i) There is a single interior steady state equilibrium value for the number of rms,
n.
(ii) If mobility costs decline, the steady state value of both the number of rms (n)
and the wage rate for skilled labor (wH = An
) decreases, whereas the steady state
number of emigrants (m = (=n   1)) increases.
(iii) If the economy was initially in steady state, then wH declines and m rises also
in the subsequent period after labor markets integrate.
< Figure 1 >
Fig. 1 graphically illustrates the impact of a decrease in mobility costs on the evolu-
tion of the number of rms when the economy is initially in steady state equilibrium. A
decline in mobility costs implies a shift of function Z from Z0 to Z1. We distinguish two
cases in which the economy converges to a unique stable steady state. In the left panel
we have Z 00(n

0) 2 (0; 1) at the initial steady state value n0. In this case, a decrease in
mobility costs implies that n gradually declines from n0 to the new steady state value
n1, i.e., emigration rises gradually over time until the economy adjusts to the new steady
state. In the right panel, where Z 00(n

0) 2 ( 1; 0), the economy uctuates while converg-
ing to the new steady state. In both cases, the model predicts that the steady state level
of emigration rises in an economy already facing brain drain.15
4 Government Response to Brain Drain
Does the main theoretical prediction in Proposition 1 (higher m is associated with a
decrease in wH) prevail if the government can respond to the productivity loss caused by
higher brain drain? One obvious response would be an emigration tax (e.g., Bhagwati
and Hamada, 1974; Bhagwati and Wilson, 1989).16 In our model, such a tax would
with the same rate as productivity measure A.
15Since Z(0) = 0, there is also always an unstable steady state equilibrium at n = 0, which however
is economically irrelevant when starting at n0 > 0 (recall limn!0 Z 0(n) > 1).
16See, for instance, Wildasin (2000), Andersson and Konrad (2003) and Andersen (2005) for other
aspects of the question how mobility of skilled labor may change the tax system.
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reduce the net di¤erence in earning opportunities for migrants, by lowering y. It thus
would mitigate brain drain, according to (16). Here we want to focus on an alternative
policy question. We examine whether it is desirable to change the level of publicly
nanced investment, in order to alleviate the adverse productivity e¤ects from higher
brain drain.
We assume that an increase public spending, G, raises the e¢ ciency of labor, i.e.,
A = a(G); (17)
where a0 > 0, a00 < 0. For instance, we may think about publicly nanced infrastructure
expenditure or spending for basic education.17 To simplify the analysis, we furthermore
assume that emigrants still have to pay their taxes in the source country.18 Also suppose
that income y of skilled emigrants is time-invariant.
We distinguish two cases. First, in the next subsection, we assume that the govern-
ment faces the constraint to balance the budget. To nd the optimal policy requires
the denition of a government objective. We assume that the government maximizes
welfare of the median voter. As emigration rates are nowhere above 50 percent, we focus
on the case that the median voter is a non-migrant. Second, we allow governments to
incur public debt. In this scenario, we assume that the government is not only concerned
about the present generation of non-migrants but also about the public decit, which
future generations have to repay. Similarly, we capture a concern for future generations
also by assuming that the level of emigration may enter the government objective, due
to adverse productivity e¤ects of emigration.
17Our formulation reects full depreciation of public investment over time, which we assume for
simplicity. According to the model, in the case of public education spending, there is literally full
depreciation since individuals only work for one period and there is no intergenerational human capital
transmission.
18The main insights of our analysis would not change if we assumed that emigrants do not pay taxes
at home. However, there would be additional e¤ects which complicate the analysis, since the tax base
would shrink due to emigration.
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4.1 Balanced Budget
Suppose rst that the government budget is balanced each period. Thus, the government
budget constraint for nancing public spending reads G =  [wLL+ (1  e)wHH]. Using
equilibrium conditions wL = (1   e)wH and H + L = 1, we have wH = G1 e . Thus,
after-tax wage income of a skilled non-migrant is given by
wnetH;t = wH;t    twH;t
= a(Gt)nt 1   Gt
1  e  w(Gt; nt 1), (18)
according to (14) and (17). We nd partial derivatives wn > 0, wGG < 0, wGn >
0. Property wn > 0 reects the specialization gains implied by a larger number of
intermediate goods producers, discussed after Lemma 1. The property that net wage
income is strictly concave as a function of G (recall a00 < 0) ensures an interior optimal
value of G, as will become apparent. Property wGn > 0 will be of particular importance:
If net wage income declines due to a decrease of the number of rms n (for instance,
triggered by a reduction in mobility costs), then the marginal impact of an increase in G
on net wages also declines. This property is an outcome of three features of the model.
First, the capital good (X) is complementary to the e¢ ciency units of labor in nal
goods production, according to (3). Second, the e¢ ciency of labor, A, is rising in public
investment, G, according to (17). Third, due to specialization e¤ects the output of the
capital good, X, depends on the number of intermediate good rms, n. Taken together,
a higher number of rms raises the impact of an increase in public investment on wages.
It is useful to write
m = 

y
wnetH
  1

 q(wnetH ); (19)
where function q has support [0; y] and fullls properties q(y) = 0, lim
wnetH !0
q(wnetH ) = 1=,
q0 < 0 and, under (A1), q00 > 0.  is a shift parameter which reects the degree of the
integration of the market for skilled labor. That is, an increase in  raises the number
of migrants for any net wage rate wnetH < y. Using (18) and (19), the di¤erence equation
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for the evolution of n, (15), can be rewritten as
nt =
1  e
f
[1  q(w(Gt; nt 1))]  1 + r

nt 1   (Gt; nt 1; ): (20)
Thus, in a steady state, the number of intermediate good rms is implicitly given by
n =  (G; n; ) (21)
as a function of G and . Note that under the assumptions of Proposition 1, there is
a single interior solution of (21) for any (G;), which we denote by function n^(G;).
Since  n < 1 holds in a stable equilibrium (which is the case we focus on) and   < 0,
we have n^(G;) < 0; that is, labor market integration reduces the steady state number
of rms for a given level of G, as we know already from part (ii) of Proposition 1.
Using (6) and (7), in equilibrium, welfare for all non-migrants is v((1 e)wnetH ), which
in t is maximized if wnetH;t = w(Gt; nt 1) is maximized. Since the number of emigrants is
adversely related to the after-tax wage rate (see (19)), the government therefore aims to
minimize emigration.
Suppose that initially the economy is in its steady state and the initial degree of
labor market integration is represented by 0. Also suppose that, in the initial period,
the public investment level maximizes long run welfare. Dene
W (G;)  w(G; n^(G;)): (22)
Initially, the level of public investment is thus given by
G0  argmax
G
W (G;0): (23)
The corresponding initial number of rms is n0 = n^(G0; 0). Since   < 0, an increase
in parameter  from 0 to 1 > 0 (decline in mobility costs) lowers the number of rms
in the next period: n1 =  (G0; n0; 1) < n0 (see also Fig. 1). We can show the following.
Proposition 2. Suppose (A1) holds and the government needs to balance its budget.
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When the economy is initially in a stable steady state and mobility costs decline (increase
from 0 to 1 > 0), the following holds:
(i) The optimal public investment level is lower than initially both in the subsequent
period after labor market integration and in the new steady state, i.e.,
G0 > G1  argmax
G
w(G; n1); (24)
G0 > G

1  argmax
G
W (G;1): (25)
(ii) Both in the subsequent period after the shift and after full adjustment to the new
steady state the after-tax wage rate for skilled labor (wnetH ) decreases and the number of
emigrants (m) increases.
Proposition 2 suggests that governments which care about non-migrants choose to
lower the level of public investment when facing higher brain drain.19 The result follows
because the marginal gain from public investment declines if there are less specialization
gains (wGn > 0), where the reduction in the number of intermediate good rms in source
economies is induced by labor market integration. Because not only the after-tax wage
rate declines but also the tax payment (G) does, the gross wage rate wH declines as well.
We can thus conclude that, as in the basic model, declining mobility costs accentuate
both migration ows and income di¤erences among economies also when public invest-
ment spending levels adjust optimally. This holds true even with respect to wage income
for skilled workers, which declines in the source economy along with higher brain drain.
We can show an additional, interesting result which highlights the role of TFP for
migration patterns, where TFP depends on the number of intermediate good rms.
Corollary 1. In steady state, the optimal long run public investment level, G, max-
imizes the long run number of rms, i.e., G = argmaxG n^(G;).
The result shows that, in the long run, minimizing the number of emigrants via public
19The result may not hold for all periods during the transition to a new steady state, as the economy
may uctuate in the transition, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 1.
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investment policy is equivalent to maximizing the steady state number of rms and thus
wages.
4.2 Debt Finance
Now we allow the government to nance public investment also by incurring a decit.
Denoting tax revenue by T , analogously to the previous subsection, we have wH =
T
1 e . The amount of government borrowing is B = G   T . Hence, wH = G B1 e and,
consequently,
wnetH;t = a(Gt)nt 1  
Gt  Bt
1  e  ~w(Gt; Bt; nt 1). (26)
A higher amount of borrowing defers costs for current public investment to the future
and thus raises current wage income, ~wB > 0. Similarly to the balanced budget case, we
nd ~wn > 0, ~wGG < 0, ~wGn > 0. Moreover, ~wBn = ~wBG = ~wBB = 0, i.e., the marginal
impact of higher borrowing on net wage rates of non-migrants does not depend on the
number of rms, the level of public investment, or the amount of borrowing.
We assume that the government care about life-time utility of non-migrants, as before.
Moreover, in order to capture potential concerns about future generations, it dislikes
borrowing. Possibly, it also dislikes brain drain per se. In order to capture such potential
concerns about future generations formally, suppose the objective function in t reads
v((1  e)wnetH;t)  (mt)   (Bt); (27)
where 0  0,  0 > 0, 00  0,  00  0 is assumed. The next proposition shows that the
basic relationship between wages and migration still prevails if governments in source
economies can run public debts when adjusting to declining mobility costs.
Proposition 3. Suppose (A1) holds and the government maximizes objective func-
tion (27) with respect to (G;B).20 When the economy is initially in a stable steady state
and mobility costs decline (increase from 0 to 1 > 0), the following holds:
(i) The optimal level of public investment is lower and the public decit is higher
20Concavity of the objective function is presumed.
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than initially in the subsequent period after labor market integration. Long run e¤ects
on investment and decit are ambiguous.
(ii) The result in part (ii) of Proposition 2 is maintained.
The short run e¤ect of declining mobility costs is similar to the e¤ect without the
possibility that the government can incur a decit (part (i)). Since the number of
rms declines in an economy facing brain drain, the impact of an increase in public
investment, G, on domestic wages declines. Analogously to the balanced budget case in
the previous subsection, this follows from property ~wGn > 0. The amount of borrowing,
B, is increasing. Intuitively, the government wants to mitigate the increased current
migration pressure by reducing the tax burden.
Also in the long run the marginal impact of higher public investment on welfare again
declines with further integration (see the proof of Proposition 3 on-line). Moreover, the
marginal impact of higher debt on welfare increases. Formally, analogously to (22), we
can express long-run welfare (27) as a function of G, B, and the level of labor market
integration, . Denote this function by W (G;B; ). We show in the appendix that, as
claimed, WG < 0 and WB > 0 hold. These e¤ects would suggest that also in the long
run non-migrants may benet from both lower public investment and higher debt when
markets for skilled labor further integrate. However, it turns out that public investment
and decits are complementary for welfare; i.e.,WGB > 0. The reason is the following. A
higher decit raises the number of rms for a given public investment level, since current
after-tax wage income increases. Thus, emigration incentives are mitigated. In turn, this
raises the marginal impact of higher public investment on wages (since ~wGn > 0) and
gives rise to property WGB > 0. Consequently, the total long run e¤ect of labor market
integration on both public investment and the public decit remain ambiguous.
Most importantly, however, our main result prevails (part (ii)). Also with the pos-
sibility of adjustment of public investment policy, declining mobility costs lower wages
even for skilled workers in the source country and aggravate the brain drain. The main
hypothesis derived from the basic model thus seems to remain robust to responses in
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public investment policy and debt nance.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyzed the dynamic interaction between migration of high-skilled
workers and relative wage income between source and destination economies of expatri-
ates. Our theoretical model showed that a decline in mobility costs not only intensies
the emigration pressure for economies already su¤ering from brain drain, but also ad-
versely a¤ects total factor productivity in the source economy. Therefore it may give
rise to future emigration. The result holds true also if economies optimally adjust their
productivity-enhancing public expenditure levels, possibly nanced by public decits.
Hence, our analysis suggests that integration of labor markets for high-skilled workers
accentuates between-country wage income inequality. Therefore, the recent movement
of the EU to attract high-skilled workers may have rst-order detrimental e¤ects even
for skilled workers in developing countries. One cannot rule out, however, that countries
which have seen a large outow of skilled workers in the more recent past may benet
in the longer run from return migration, remittances, or increased education levels.
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On-Line Appendix with Proofs for
"Does International Mobility of High-Skilled Workers
Aggravate Between-Country Inequality?"
by Volker Grossmann and David Stadelmann
Proof of Lemma 1. Factor prices in the nal goods sector equal marginal produc-
tivities; thus, wH = Y=HY and wL = (1      )Y=LY . Using (7), we nd that the
relative input of the two types of labor in the domestic economy is independent of the
level of migration:
HY
LY
=
(1  e)
1     : (28)
From the inverse demand function of any intermediate good rm j, optimal price p(j) =
r= and the production function in the nal goods sector (3) we nd
xt 1(j) =

2
(1 + r)r
 1
1 

HY;t
Lt;Y
 
1 
AtLY;t  xt 1: (29)
The production function for the capital good, (4), implies that (Xt) = nt 1 (xt 1)

Substituting this into (3) and using both (28) and (29) leads to
Yt = nt 1

2
(1 + r)r
 
1 

(1  e)
1    
 
1 
AtLY;t: (30)
Substituting (30) into wL = (1  )Y=L and combining the resulting expression with
wH =
wL
1 e from (7) conrms (14).
Expression (16) follows from substituting (14) into (13) and using wnetH = (1  )wH .
To conrm (15), rst, insert H = 1  L in (12) and use both (28) and (11) to nd
LY = L =
1    
1  

1 m  nf
1  e

: (31)
Next, we employ the zero-prot condition for intermediate good rms, (j) = 0, or
(p(j)  r)x(j) = wHf , according to (10). Substituting into the latter equation p(j) =
r=, the expression for x(j) in (29) and the expression for wH in (14), as well as using
1
(28) and (31) leads to
(1  e)
1 + r

1 mt   ntf
1  e

= nt 1f: (32)
Substituting (16) into (32) and solving for nt we obtain (15). From (15), it it is straight-
forward to derive the claimed properties of function Z(n). 
Proof of Proposition 1. According to Lemma 1, function Z starts at zero and
initially has a slope above unity which eventually turns negative. Because we know that,
in addition, Z 00 < 0 holds under (A1), there is a single non-zero value n which fullls
Z(n) = n. This conrms part (i). To conrm part (ii), note from the denition of Z
in (15) that the value of Z decreases for each n > 0 if mobility costs decline and employ
Fig. 1. Part (iii) can immediately be inferred from Fig. 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First, note from the denition of G1 that it is given by
wG(G1; n1) = 0 (recall wGG < 0). Recalling n1 < n0 and wGn > 0 conrms (24).
In steady state, the rst-order condition to the maximization of W (G;) reads
[WG(G;) =]wG(G; n^(G;)) + wn(G; n^(G;))n^G(G;) = 0; (33)
according to (22). Applying the implicit function theorem to (21), we obtain:
n^G(G;) =
 G(G; n^; )
1   n(G; n^; ) : (34)
Note that the denominator is positive in a stable steady state equilibrium ( n(G; n^; ) <
1). Moreover, from (20) we nd
 G(G; n^; ) =  1  e
f
q0 (w(G; n^))wG(G; n^): (35)
Substituting (34) into (33) and using (35), we can rewrite the rst-order condition to
wG(G; n^)

1  1  e
f
q0 (w(G; n^))
wn(G; n^)
1   n(G; n^; )

= 0: (36)
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Dene G()  argmaxG W (G;) as the optimal log-run public investment level. Sup-
pose that G is given by rst-order condition (33). (It will become apparent that the
second-order condition indeed holds.) As the term in squared brackets in (36) is positive,
we nd that G is given by
wG(G
; n^(G; )) = 0: (37)
Thus, we also have n^G(G; ) = 0, according to (34) and (35).
We next show that the second-order condition holds, i.e., WGG(G; ) < 0. To see
this, note that n^G(G; ) = 0 implies that WG(G; ) = wG(G; n^(G; )) when G is
given by rst-order condition (33). Hence,
WGG(G
; ) = (wGG + wGnn^G)jG=G : (38)
Using again n^G(G; ) = 0, we thus have WGG(G; ) = (wGG)jG=G. Recalling that
wGG < 0 conrms that the second-order condition holds.
Moreover, we have
WG(G
; ) = (wGnn^)jG=G : (39)
Thus,
dG()
d
=  WG(G
; )
WGG(G; )
=

 wGnn^
wGG

G=G
: (40)
Since wGG < 0, wGn > 0 and n^ < 0, we nd that G is decreasing with , which
conrms (25) and concludes the proof of part (i).
To prove part (ii), recall rst that wn > 0. Since public investment is chosen optimally
before and after the change in the degree of labor market integration (wG(G1; n1) =
wG(G0; n0) = 0) and n1 < n0, we have w(G1; n1) < w(G0; n0) for the net wage rate. For
the level of emigration, according to (19) and property q0 < 0, this implies
m1 = 1q(w(G1; n1)) > 0q(w(G0; n0)) = m0: (41)
This conrms the result for the subsequent period after labor market integration.
Now write G() as the function which is implicitly dened by n^G(G; ) = 0 and
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dene W ()  W (G(); ). W () is the steady state value of the net wage rate wnetH
when G is chosen optimally. We nd that
dW 
d
= WG(G
; )
dG
d
+W(G
; ). (42)
Note that WG(G; ) = 0 and W(G; ) = wnn^jG=G < 0, where the latter is implied
from using denition (22) together with n^G(G; ) = 0. Thus, dW =d < 0. Moreover,
note that the steady state number of migrants is given by
m()  q(W ()); (43)
under the optimal choice of G. Using q0 < 0 then implies that m is increasing in .
This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Using (34) and (35) together with wG(G; n^) = n^G(G; ) =
0, it is easy to conrm that n^GG(G; ) < 0, by utilizing property wGG < 0. This shows
that G, which is given by (37), maximizes n^(G;). 
Proof of Proposition 3. Analogously to (20), by using (26), the di¤erence equation
for the evolution of n can be written as
nt =
1  e
f
[1  q( ~w(Gt; Bt; nt 1))]  1 + r

nt 1  ~ (Gt; Bt; nt 1; ): (44)
For a given scal policy, (G;B), the steady state number of rms, n, is implicitly dened
by n = ~ (G;B; n; ), where stability requires that ~ n(G;B; n; ) < 1. n is a function
of (G;B; ) which is denoted by ~n(G;B; ). Substituting m = q(wnetH ) and (26) into
(27), long run welfare can be written as
W (G;B; )  v((1  e) ~w(G;B; ~n(G;B; )))  (q( ~w(G;B; ~n(G;B; ))))  (B): (45)
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Since the economy is initially in a stable steady state, initially, scal policy is given by
(G0; B

0)  arg max
(G;B)
W (G;B; 0): (46)
Thus, the initial number of rms is n0 = ~n(G0; B

0 ; 0) =
~ (G0; B

0 ; n0; 0). Moreover, if
labor market integration shifts from 0 to 1 > 0, we have n1 = ~ (G

0; B

0 ; n0; 1) < n0,
according to (44). Also dene
W (G;B; n)  v((1  e) ~w(G;B; n))  (q( ~w(G;B; n)))   (B) (47)
and
(G1; B1)  arg max
(G;B)
W (G;B; n1): (48)
First-order conditions to the maximization problem in (48) are:
WG = [v
0((1  e) ~w)(1  e)  0(q( ~w))q0( ~w)] ~wG = 0; (49)
WB = [v
0((1  e) ~w)(1  e)  0(q( ~w))q0( ~w)] ~wB    0(B) = 0: (50)
Since the term in squared brackets in (49) and (50) is positive (recall v0 > 0, 0 >
0, q0 < 0), we have ~wG(G1; B1; n) = 0. Together with ~wGB = 0, we thus nd that
WGB(G1; B1; n1) = 0. Moreover, WGG(G1; B1; n1) < 0 and WGn(G1; B1; n1) > 0 since
~wGG < 0 and ~wGn > 0, respectively. Thus, G1 is decreasing in n1. Since n1 < n0, it
follows that G1 < G0. Moreover, we have
WBB =

(1  e)2v00   00()2q0   0q00 ( ~wB)2    00 < 0; (51)
WBn =

(1  e)2v00   00()2q0   0q00 ~wn ~wB < 0 (52)
(recall ~wBB = 0, v00 < 0, 
00  0, q00 > 0,  00  0). Thus, B1 is decreasing in n1. Since
n1 < n0, it follows that B1 > B0 .
It remains to be shown that long run e¤ects are ambiguous. The rst-order conditions
to the problem of maximizing long run welfare (45)),W (G;B; ), with respect to (G;B),
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are:
WG = [v
0((1  e) ~w)(1  e)  0(q( ~w))q0( ~w)] ( ~wG + ~wn~nG) = 0; (53)
WB = [v
0((1  e) ~w)(1  e)  0(q( ~w))q0( ~w)] ( ~wB + ~wn~nB)   0(B) = 0: (54)
According to (44), we have
~nG =  
1 e
f
q0( ~w) ~wG
1  ~ n
and ~nB =  
1 e
f
q0( ~w) ~wB
1  ~ n
> 0: (55)
The latter inequality follows from ~ n < 1 (which holds in stable steady state), q0 < 0
and ~wB > 0. Using (55) in (53) and (54), we can write
WG = 
 ~wG = 0; (56)
WB = 
 ~wB    0(B) = 0; (57)
where

  [v0((1  e) ~w)(1  e)  0(q( ~w))q0( ~w)]jn=n ; (58)
 
 
1 
1 e
f
q0( ~w)
1  ~ n
!
n=n
: (59)
Note that 
 > 0 and  > 0. Thus, at the optimal long run levels (G; B), it holds that
~wG = ~nG = 0. This implies
WGGj(G;B) = 
 ~wGG < 0; (60)
WGBj(G;B) = 
( ~wGB + ~wGn~nB) > 0; (61)
where the inequality in (60) follows from ~wGG < 0 and the one in (61) from ~wGB = 0,
~wGn > 0, ~nB > 0. Moreover,
WGj(G;B) = 
 ~wGn~n < 0; (62)
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where the inequality follows from ~wGn > 0 and
~n =  
1 e
f
q( ~w)
1  ~ n
< 0: (63)
Next, note that
@

@B
=

(1  e)2v00   002q0()2   0q00() ( ~wB + ~wn~nB); (64)
@

@
= (1  e)2v00 ~wn~n   00q0 [q + q0 ~wn~n]  0 [q0 + q00 ~wn~n] ; (65)
@
@B
=  1  e
f

q00( ~wB + ~wn~nB)(1  ~ n) + q0(~ nB + ~ nn~nB)
1  ~ n
2 ; (66)
@
@
=  1  e
f
[q0 + q00 ~wn~n] (1  ~ n) + q0(~ n + ~ nn~n)
1  ~ n
2 : (67)
From v00 < 0, 00  0, q0 < 0, 0  0, q00 > 0, ~wB > 0, ~wn > 0, ~nB > 0, ~n < 0, we nd
that @
=@B < 0 and @
=@ > 0. Moreover, using the denition of ~  in (44), we have
~ n =  1  e
f
q0( ~w) ~wn   1 + r

:
Thus, recalling ~wB > 0, ~wn > 0, ~wnn = 0, ~nB > 0, ~n < 0, q0 < 0, q00 > 0, we nd
~ nB =  1  e
f
q00( ~wB + ~wn~nB) < 0; (68)
~ nn =  1  e
f


q00 ( ~wn)
2 + q0 ~wnn

< 0; (69)
~ n =  1  e
f
q0 ~wn > 0: (70)
Thus, @=@B < 0 and @=@ > 0. Recalling ~wBB = ~wBn = 0 and  
00  0, we then have
WBB =
@

@B
 ~wB + 

@
@B
~wB + 
( ~wBB + ~wBn~nB)   00(B) < 0; (71)
WB =
@

@
 ~wB + 

@
@
~wB + 
 ~wBn~n > 0: (72)
Note that concavity ofW as a function of (G;B) requires thatWGGWBB (WGB)2 >
7
0. According to Cramers rule, we then have
sgn

dG
d

= sgn ( WGWBB +WBGWB)j(G;B) ; (73)
sgn

dB
d

= sgn ( WGGWB +WGBWG)j(G;B) : (74)
Thus, using the previous results on the signs of the second derivatives on the right hand
sides of (73) and (74) conrms that long run e¤ects of labor market integration on scal
variables are ambiguous. This conrms part (i).
To prove part (ii), rst note that analogously to the proof of part (ii) of Proposition
2, n1 < n0 implies that wnetH declines and m increases in the period subsequent to
labor market integration. To show the result for the steady state, dene W () 
W (G(); B(); ). We nd that
dW 
d
= WG(G
; B; )
dG
d
+WB(G
; B; )
dB
d
+W(G
; B; ), (75)
where WG = WB = 0 at (G; B) and, according to (45),
W = (1  e)v0 ~wn~n   0 [q + q0 ~wn~n] < 0: (76)
Thus, dW =d < 0. Analogously to the proof of Proposition 2, together with (43) for
the steady state level of migration, this concludes the proof. 
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